Accounting Expert Partly Allowed to Opine on Loss of Earning Capacity

Posted on November 20, 2026 by Shuva Guha Thakurta

This case involves bodily injuries resulting from a vehicular accident on July 17, 2025, between Marilyn Ferguson and Defendant Dionne Williams. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant Williams was driving a vehicle owned and maintained by Defendant Evans Delivery. Specifically, Plaintiffs contended that while driving the vehicle, Defendant Williams failed to keep a lookout and failed to control his speed, causing the accident. Plaintiffs asserted claims for negligence and gross negligence against all Defendants.

Plaintiffs designated Harold A. Asher, Jeffrey Meyers, and Matthew W. Hyzy as retained experts. Defendants sought to exclude the experts' opinions.

Accounting Expert Partly Allowed to Opine on Loss of Earning Capacity

Accounting Expert Witness

Harold Alan Asher has an MBA in accounting and finance, has been a CPA since 1976, and has credentials and experience in business valuation, financial forensics, and personal-injury damages.

Get the full story on challenges to Harold Asher’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

Business Valuation Expert Witness

Jeffrey E. Meyers has a master's degree in mathematics and statistics, valuation and financial-forensics credentials, and experience calculating personal injury damages and future medical costs.

Want to know more about the challenges Jeffrey Meyers has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation Expert Witness

Dr. Matthew William Hyzy is a Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation Specialist who has practiced medicine since 2012.

Hyzy is certified by the American Board of Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation. Hyzy earned a Doctor of Osteopathic Medicine from Lake Erie College of Osteopathic Medicine in Bradenton, Florida, and a Bachelor of Science in Biology from the University of West Florida in Pensacola.

Get the full story on challenges to Matthew Hyzy’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

Discussion by the Court

1. Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Harold Asher and Jeffrey Meyers

Defendants sought to exclude Harold Asher's and Jeffrey Meyers' opinions on the grounds that: (1) they lack an evidentiary foundation for any opinion concerning loss of earning capacity because an economist may quantify an established loss but cannot independently establish the underlying impairment; (2) the experts' use of hypothetical earning scenarios is unreliable because they provide two substantially different projections without identifying which, if either, is reasonably probable; and (3) the experts' methodology is unreliable because it is not based on sufficient facts or data and intentionally excludes relevant information. Plaintiffs argued that the economists are qualified to perform reliable economic calculations, that their opinions are based on identifiable wage data and supported assumptions, and that Defendants' objections concern the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.

I. Foundation for Loss of Earning Capacity

Defendants argued that Plaintiffs’ economic experts expressly declined to opine on whether Ferguson actually suffered a loss of earning capacity. The experts acknowledged that any such opinion would depend on testimony from physicians, vocational evaluators, or others.

Defendants noted that Plaintiffs did not designate a vocational expert. They also noted that no treating or retained physician opined that Ferguson could not work, perform any category of work, or pursue further education. Defendants further argued that the evidence affirmatively contradicted any claim of impaired earning capacity. They pointed out that Ferguson returned to work and was never excused from work by a physician. She also recently took a second job and could occasionally lift up to 25 pounds. Without evidence of actual impairment, Defendants argued, a projection of her lifetime gross earning capacity was irrelevant and would not assist the jury. They also warned that the jury might treat a seven-figure projection as an established measure of damages.

The Court noted that Asher and Meyers specifically disclaimed any opinion on loss of earning capacity. Instead, the experts said they were responding to hypotheticals posed by counsel. The Court found the use of hypotheticals generally permissible. Where the actual evidence contradicted the hypothetical testimony, Defendants could use that evidence to cross-examine the experts. The Court also addressed whether the argument was really a challenge to qualifications. It agreed with Plaintiffs that at least one court in the Fifth Circuit had recently found Asher and Meyers qualified to opine on future economic losses.

The Court found that the experts were qualified to testify about economic losses. It also found no basis to generally exclude their testimony on earning capacity.

II. Hypothetical Earning Scenarios

Defendants next challenged the experts’ two hypothetical earnings scenarios.

Under Scenario One, the experts assigned Ferguson a pre-accident annual wage of $38,050, based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ statewide mean wage for hairdressers, hairstylists, and cosmetologists. Defendants argued that nothing in the record showed that Ferguson had ever formally worked as a cosmetologist, held a cosmetology license, received a job offer in the field, or earned anything close to that amount. Instead, her verified interrogatory responses showed that she worked part-time, earning between $9.00 and $12.30 per hour. According to Defendants, the experts improperly replaced Ferguson’s documented earnings with a statewide occupational average, even though their own expert designation identified her earnings at the time of injury as a relevant factor.

Under Scenario Two, the experts assumed that Ferguson would complete nursing school and, beginning January 1, 2031, earn the Texas mean annual wage for registered nurses of $84,320, plus 15% in fringe benefits. Defendants argued that this assumption lacked any evidentiary support: the record contained no evidence that Ferguson had enrolled in or applied to a nursing program, completed prerequisite coursework, produced academic transcripts, testified about a nursing career, or undergone a vocational assessment. Defendants also argued that the experts failed to explain how the accident would prevent Ferguson from becoming a nurse, particularly since no physician had imposed work restrictions.

The Court treated the two scenarios differently. As to Scenario One, it was undisputed that Ferguson had completed her cosmetology certificate; in fact, the accident occurred as she was returning from her cosmetology school graduation. Because she had only just graduated, she naturally had no past wages in that career, but the Court found that a hypothetical projection of her future wages was not unreliable on that basis alone.

Scenario Two, however, rested on little more than an alleged statement that Ferguson intended to attend nursing school before the accident. Nothing indicated that she had applied to nursing school or taken any concrete steps toward it, such as completing prerequisite coursework. The Court explained that a plaintiff need not have enrolled in or completed an educational program before claiming lost earning capacity in that profession, since future earning capacity always involves some uncertainty. A plaintiff must, however, establish a sufficient factual basis showing that the proposed career path is likely.

Here, a stated intention to attend nursing school, unaccompanied by enrollment, an application, prerequisites, admission, coursework, or other concrete steps, was not enough to support the nursing-career projection. Because Scenario Two depended on that unsupported premise, the Court found it speculative and unlikely to materially assist the jury in determining Ferguson’s actual loss of earning capacity. The Court therefore limited Asher’s and Meyers’ opinions to exclude Scenario Two.

III. Methodology

Lastly, Defendants argued that the experts’ methodology was unreliable. They contended that it lacked sufficient facts or data and intentionally excluded relevant information. According to Defendants, Asher and Meyers relied only on eight weeks of post-accident pay stubs, a pleading, and Hyzy’s report. Defendants said the experts failed to consider Ferguson’s tax returns, written discovery responses, employment files, or medical records.

Defendants maintained that these omissions were especially significant. They argued that the excluded information bore directly on the assumptions behind the experts’ calculations. In their view, ignoring readily available evidence that contradicted those assumptions created a fundamental analytical gap. They argued this showed the experts did not reliably apply their methods to the facts of the case.

The Court held that the argument about omitted records went to the weight of the experts’ opinions, not their admissibility. As Defendants conceded and the record showed, Asher and Meyers listed Ross earnings statements, Hyzy’s life care plan, the amended petition, and an economic checklist as materials reviewed. The Court explained that any dispute over which materials the experts considered or ignored should be addressed by “vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof.” The Court found no basis to exclude the testimony on these grounds.

2. Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Matthew Hyzy

I. Hyzy's Neurological, Psychiatric, and Orthopedic Spinal Opinions

Defendants first argued that Hyzy, a PM&R specialist, lacked the qualifications to offer opinions concerning orthopedic spinal procedures, neurological diagnoses, and psychiatric conditions.

Hyzy is a board-certified PM&R physician. He completed a residency in Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation and a fellowship in interventional spine, sports, pain, and regenerative orthopedics. His clinical work involved life care planning, performing interventional spine pain-management injections, rehabilitation and interventional procedures for brain injuries, and psychological evaluation or treatment as part of a patient's rehabilitation needs. These credentials and experience appeared to give Hyzy a qualified basis to opine on matters relating to neurology, psychiatry, and orthopedics.

II. Hyzy's Life Care Planning Opinions

Defendants next argued that Hyzy lacked the training and credentials necessary to qualify as a life care planning expert because his curriculum vitae does not reflect certification as either a certified life care planner or a certified physician life care planner, nor does it identify formal education or coursework in life care planning.

Hyzy's credentials outlined herein appear to qualify him to opine on life care planning. He is board-certified as a PM&R physician and a Certified Life Care Planner through the International Commission on Health Care Certification and has additional clinical experience. Courts have found PM&R certified physicians qualified to testify to life care planning without any of the additional credentials or certifications that Defendants imply are needed.

III. Hyzy's Methodology

Defendants next argued that Hyzy’s methodology independently failed the reliability requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 702. They contended that his opinions lacked sufficient facts or data. They also argued that he did not reliably apply his methodology to the facts of the case. Specifically, Defendants said Hyzy reviewed only post-accident medical records. They argued that he relied on histories provided by Plaintiffs instead of obtaining and reviewing their complete pre-accident medical histories.

The Court held that the argument about Hyzy not reviewing pre-accident medical records went to the weight of his opinions, not their admissibility. The Court therefore found Hyzy’s opinions admissible.

IV. Undisclosed Opinions

Defendants additionally argued that Plaintiffs' expert designation identifies opinions that Hyzy's actual reports do not contain. Specifically, Defendants argued that Plaintiffs' expert designation represents that Hyzy will testify regarding the reasonableness and necessity of past medical treatment, past medical expenses, and the usual and customary charges for medical services, but that Hyzy's reports consist exclusively of forward-looking life care plans and contain no opinions addressing whether past treatment was necessary, whether past medical charges were reasonable, or whether the amounts billed were consistent with usual and customary charges in the relevant market.

Defendants further argued that Plaintiffs' representations state that Hyzy will offer causation testimony concerning the injuries sustained in the accident, but his reports merely state that the future medical requirements identified in the life care plans are specifically attributable to medical conditions resulting from the accident, without providing biomechanical reasoning, differential analysis, or any articulated explanation supporting that conclusion.

As to the first argument, Defendants' argument is not that Hyzy failed to disclose something that he is now trying to include, but rather that he disclosed something that is not being offered in his report and testimony. As to the second argument, this appears not to be a disclosure issue but a challenge as to causation.

The Court need not make a preemptive ruling on matters outside of the scope of the expert report, as such testimony has not yet been given or plainly identified. Those objections may be made during the pretrial or trial proceedings. Similarly, as to the issue of causation, Hyzy may again rely on what is disclosed in his report. Challenges to those opinions and corresponding testimony may be made at trial but do not presently serve as a basis for exclusion.

V. Request for Alternative Limitation

Finally, Defendants alternatively requested that if the Court declined to exclude the opinions of Hyzy, that the Court: (1) limit his testimony to the formulation and costing of the life care plan, without permitting him to independently opine on surgical necessity, neurological diagnoses, or psychiatric diagnoses; (2) require Hyzy to identify and attribute each medical recommendation in his plan to the specific qualified treating physician who made that recommendation; and (3) instruct the jury that Hyzy is not an orthopedic surgeon, neurologist, or psychiatrist and that her opinions on those subjects should be evaluated in light of those limitations.

These conclusory requests are the extent of Defendants' alternative request argument. While these arguments may have presented some plausible basis to limit the testimony of Hyzy, Defendants' arguments are no more than conclusory requests that the Court cannot rule on as presented. To the extent that Defendants seek to limit this testimony, they will need to raise any such argument during pretrial or trial proceedings.

Held

The Court granted in part and denied in part the Defendants' motion to strike the testimony of Harold Asher and Jeffrey Meyers but denied the Defendants' motion to strike the testimony of Matthew Hyzy.

Key Takeaway

Testimony regarding future earnings, even where speculative and conjectural, is admissible as it goes to the weight of the evidence.

Case Details

Case Caption:

Ferguson V. Evans Delivery Company, Inc.

Docket Number:

6:25cv472

Court Name:

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Tyler Division

Order Date:

November 17, 2026