Maxillofacial Surgery Expert Partly Allowed to Opine on the Breach of the Standard of Care

Posted on November 18, 2026 by Shuva Guha Thakurta

This is a medical malpractice action in which the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant, Dr. Michael Couchot, breached the standard of care in his treatment of Plaintiff, Jennifer Shell. Specifically, the Plaintiff alleged that on October 10, 2024, she presented to the office of Couchot for the possible extraction of tooth #4. Prior to the procedure, Plaintiff claimed that she informed Couchot’s staff that she had questions she wanted him to address before giving her final consent. Plaintiff alleged that she attempted to ask Couchot said questions, but they were not answered to her liking, and according to her, she clearly and unequivocally withdrew her consent for the procedure. However, despite what the Plaintiff claims was a clear revocation of consent, Couchot proceeded with the procedure against her wishes.

Defendants filed a Daubert motion to strike and exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert witness, Dr. Dean DeLuke.

 Maxillofacial Surgery Expert Partly Allowed to Opine on the Breach of the Standard of Care

Maxillofacial Surgery Expert Witness

Dr. Dean M. DeLuke is a graduate of Columbia University School of Dental and Oral Surgery (D.D.S.) with over 40 years of experience in oral and maxillofacial surgery.

Get the full story on challenges to Dean DeLuke's expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

Discussion by the Court

At that hearing, the Court inquired as to how DeLuke's testimony would assist the trier of fact when the salient issue was whether Couchot had committed the intentional tort of battery by performing the medical procedure in question without consent. In other words, the Court was puzzled as to how expert testimony would help the trier of fact determine whether there was consent in this case because that is a simple question of fact that merely hinges on whether the jury finds the Plaintiff's or the Defendants' version of the facts to be more credible.

Given DeLuke's academic credentials and forty-plus years of experience as a maxillofacial surgeon, it is clear that he is qualified through personal knowledge and experience to offer a reliable opinion on the standard of care a physician should adhere to when deciding whether to proceed with oral surgery.

Thus, the Court concluded that DeLuke's testimony is relevant and admissible under Rule 702 to the extent that he testifies about the standard of care to which a physician should adhere under circumstances like those at issue here.

But there is one limitation on the admissibility of DeLuke's testimony. He will not be allowed to testify specifically that Couchot breached the standard of care by performing the procedure without the Plaintiff's consent. Such testimony would not assist the trier of fact to understand any fact in issue. The reason for this is that Couchot's conduct would amount to battery, not negligence, if he performed the procedure without consent. The Plaintiff's counsel clarified that this is not just a battery case—the Plaintiff is also pursuing a negligence case in the alternative. Battery is an entirely distinct tort from negligence. And a breach of some standard of care is not an element of battery.

So if the jury concluded that Couchot performed the procedure without consent, then DeLuke's testimony that it was a breach of the standard of care will be irrelevant and unhelpful to the trier of fact because it will not pertain to any fact that is in issue.

To be clear, however, DeLuke will still be able to testify that—in his opinion—it would have been a breach of the standard of care for Couchot to perform the procedure with consent if the Plaintiff were undergoing a panic attack at the time. In his expert report, DeLuke stated, "it is my professional opinion that it was a breach of the standard of care for Dr. Couchot to move forward with the extraction procedure after the patient, Ms. Shell, verbally withdrew her consent and/or 'had a panic attack.'" In other words, DeLuke has offered an opinion that Couchot breached the standard of care in either of two alternative scenarios—i.e., if he lacked consent, or, no matter whether he had consent, if he performed the procedure after the Plaintiff had a panic attack. As explained above, the former portion of the opinion addresses a situation that falls within the tort of battery, and so it is not a relevant opinion. But the latter, alternative portion of his opinion addresses whether there would be a breach of the standard of care in the event that the Plaintiff gave consent but was nevertheless experiencing a panic attack. That portion of his opinion is relevant and helpful to the trier of fact, so it is admissible.

Held

The Court granted in part and denied in part the Defendants' Daubert motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Dean DeLuke.

Key Takeaway

Rule 702 requires a proposed expert witness have the requisite qualifications, whether it be through "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education," that the proposed testimony be relevant, meaning that it "will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue," and that the testimony "be reliable."

Case Details:

Case Caption:

Shell V. Couchot

Docket Number:

0:25cv96

Court Name:

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, Northern Division

Order Date:

November 13, 2026