Psychiatry Expert Was Not Allowed to Testify Regarding Forensic Psychology
Posted on November 17, 2026 by Shuva Guha Thakurta
Plaintiff Felix Nkansah (“Plaintiff”) brought this action against the United States for assault and battery after Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) officers allegedly mistreated Plaintiff while he was in their custody on August 17, 2015. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on all his claims, including those that were previously dismissed, arguing that he presented unrebutted evidence to demonstrate that the ICE officers’ actions violated the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). Because there are material disputes of fact regarding whether the officers’ actions were reasonable, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff designated Dr. Richard Lucas and Dr. Carlos J. Figarola to offer expert testimony on Plaintiff’s post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) diagnosis and to respond to the Government’s rebuttal report on forensic psychology, and Mr. Paul Gazaleh to testify regarding Plaintiff’s alleged lost income. Under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Defendant sought to preclude in part the testimony of Dr. Lucas, and to preclude the testimony of Dr. Figarola and Mr. Gazaleh.

Psychology Expert Witness
Dr. Richard A. Lucas holds a Ph.D. in Clinical Psychology; a Master's degree in Psychology from the University of Texas at Austin; and a Bachelor of Science degree in Humanities and Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Psychiatry Expert Witness
Dr. Carlos Jesus Figarola is a board-certified psychiatrist based in Freehold, New Jersey. Figarola received his M.D. from Ross University School of Medicine in Dominica, West Indies, in 1981. He completed his residency in the Department of Psychiatry at Cabrini Medical Center in New York City.
Accounting Expert Witness
Paul Gazaleh is a Certified Public Accountant licensed in New Jersey and accredited in Business Valuation.
Discussion by the Court
I. Dr. Richard Lucas
Plaintiff proffered Dr. Richard Lucas as an expert in clinical psychology and forensic psychology. He is Plaintiff's treating clinical psychologist.
Lucas produced expert reports that (1) diagnosed Plaintiff with PTSD by applying criteria from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th Edition ("DSM-V"); (2) opined on Plaintiff's concentration and ability to work; and (3) rebutted the conclusions of the forensic psychology tests administered and interpreted by the Government's rebuttal expert.
The Government did not challenge Lucas' expertise to testify on his diagnosis of Plaintiff's PTSD. Instead, the Government seeks to preclude his opinion on Plaintiff's ability to work and his opinion on forensic psychology.
A. Testimony on Plaintiff's Ability to Work
Lucas is qualified to testify regarding clinical observations that informed his PTSD diagnosis of Plaintiff. The Government does not challenge this testimony. Lucas is not qualified, however, to testify as to how or why his clinical observations affected Plaintiff's daily functioning or at work.
In his report, Lucas compares his clinical observations of Plaintiff to criteria A through H of DSM-V to determine whether Plaintiff has PTSD. After a thorough review, Lucas concluded that Plaintiff meets the "full criteria for a diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder." Criterion G requires, "the disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning." Lucas found that Plaintiff's "academic, work and general day-to-day functioning have clearly been markedly impaired," as he had to stop running his business, could not complete school, has been unable to sleep, is on edge in public settings, and suffers from depression. In his deposition, Lucas discussed Plaintiff's inability to work and concentrate.
Lucas is not qualified to testify as an expert regarding Plaintiff's ability to work for three reasons. First, Lucas is a clinical psychologist, not a vocational expert. His C.V. does not indicate any experience as a vocational or functional expert. Second, Lucas did not administer any tests to evaluate Plaintiff's concentration or functional ability. Absent these evaluations, Lucas' testimony concerning the extent to which Plaintiff's PTSD affected his ability to work would be based on speculation. Third, any opinion about Plaintiff's ability to work would not be based on Lucas' purported expertise; rather, it would be based on common sense principles unrelated to his expertise. This type of speculative testimony, based on common sense rather than a methodology, is reflected in Lucas' deposition. He stated, "I don't know how you can sustain work or concentration if your sleep is as subpar as his has been."
Lucas is qualified, however, to testify regarding genuine clinical observations, such as Plaintiff being "on edge," showing a fragmentary memory, "walling off his affect," or suffering from a "deep depression." He may be able to testify to Plaintiff's inability to sleep and lack of concentration during sessions, if based on sufficient observations of Plaintiff.
Lucas cannot testify as to why or how Plaintiff has "stopped running his business," Plaintiff's failure "to complete his collegiate course of studies," or his "ability to concentrate in a workplace setting." Plaintiff argued that Lucas is not offering a formal vocational assessment, but rather he is testifying regarding "clinical observations about Plaintiff's functional limitations due to PTSD." These opinions, however, go beyond the scope of clinical observations and are beyond the scope of his expertise.
For these reasons, the Court decided that Lucas is precluded from testifying regarding Plaintiff's ability to work or concentrate when not based on clinical observations.
B. Testimony on Forensic Psychology
1. Lucas' Opinions are Procedurally Improper
First, Lucas' opinions on forensic psychology in his January 9, 2023, letter are improper surrebuttal testimony. Here, there was a Scheduling Order governing expert discovery deadlines. The Order required Plaintiff's expert disclosures by September 16, 2022, and Defendant's rebuttal disclosures by November 15, 2022. It did not contemplate further rebuttals by Plaintiff. Further, in the parties' joint letter to the Court, Plaintiff did not request a surrebuttal report despite qualifying the Government's reports as "rebuttal reports."
2. Lucas is Not Qualified to Testify Regarding Forensic Psychology
Second, Lucas' testimony regarding forensic psychology is precluded because Lucas is not qualified as a forensic psychology expert under Rule 702.
In his surrebuttal report, Lucas questioned the validity of the F-scale used in the MMPI tests to detect malingering in cases of PTSD, accepted Plaintiff's MENT scores as reliable, and provided alternative explanations for why Plaintiff performed poorly on the TOMM. The Government argued that Lucas is not qualified to testify on this subject because he does not have forensic psychology credentials or experience and he has no experience with the MMPI-3, MENT, or TOMM. Plaintiff did not rebut the Government's arguments.
Lucas disclaims expertise in the field of forensic psychology. In his letter, Lucas responded, "not as a forensic psychologist but rather as a fact witness who is a generalist." In his deposition, he affirmed that he is "not an expert in forensic psychology," does not "stand behind his opinions or feel like I know what I'm doing" as a forensic expert, and does not know the standard of care for a forensic psychologist.
Lucas's self-evaluation of his expertise is not dispositive; his credentials and relevant experience, however, are insufficient. A court "may properly conclude that witnesses are insufficiently qualified . . . because their expertise is too general." His C.V. consists of decades of experience in clinical psychology, but none in forensic psychology. Plaintiff did not offer evidence showing that Lucas has the credentials or experience in forensic psychology relevant to serve as a general expert witness on the subject.
Additionally, Lucas lacked the requisite experience with the MMPI-3, MENT, or TOMM to qualify as an expert. Here, Lucas concedes that he has never administered the MMPI-3, MENT, or TOMM, and thus his ability to act as an expert on these tests is limited. In the report, Lucas questions whether the F-scale used in the MMPI assessment can accurately detect malingering in PTSD cases. But he admits that his understanding is based on an older, "rather different" version of the MMPI, the MMPI-2. He further stated, "it is not known to him if the MMPI-3's version of the F scale is based on some, most or all of the original F-scale items." At his deposition, Lucas could not answer questions about the normal range of F-scores on the MMPI-3 for patients with PTSD or whether Plaintiff's score was abnormal.
It is Plaintiff's burden to show that it is more likely than not that Lucas' proposed testimony is admissible. Lucas' lack of credentials or experience in forensic psychology and his lack of experience with the three relevant tests administered to Plaintiff make him unqualified to testify as an expert regarding forensic psychology.
II. Dr. Carlos Figarola
Plaintiff proffered Carlos Figarola as an expert in adult psychiatry and forensic psychology. Figarola submitted four letters that constitute his expert report. His initial letter, from September 2022, consists of a single page stating that he reviewed two sets of records and concluding that Plaintiff suffers from chronic PTSD due to his incarceration. In January 2023, Figarola submitted a "Psychiatric Report" for which he reviewed medical records, reports from two of the Government's rebuttal experts, as well as video from the incident. The letter recounts Plaintiff's narrative testimony of the incident. It contains the same conclusion that Plaintiff suffers PTSD due to his experience with ICE. Figarola concluded "upon a reasonable degree of psychiatric certainty" that Plaintiff is "ill and disabled as a result of his experience." On February 6, 2023, Plaintiff submitted a letter titled: "Addition to the psychiatric report dated 1/02/2023." This letter clarifies that Plaintiff was interviewed twice for the January 2023 report. It stated that the report represents contemporaneous notes and "much of the history provided is taken verbatim or closely paraphrases the statements of the interviewee." On February 28, 2023, Figarola submitted a single-sentence letter that states, Plaintiff's prognosis is poor, and his condition is chronic and not likely to improve for the remainder of his life."
A. Figarola's Reports on PTSD are Conclusory
Lucas' September 2022 Report is not an independent expert opinion. Plaintiff conceded that Figarola's September Report is based entirely on Lucas' report. Further, Figarola's report provided no methodology for how he arrived at his conclusion. Figarola's September 2022 Report consists only of a conclusion that Plaintiff has PTSD. Where the report simply states the conclusion along with the records reviewed, the Court cannot evaluate the reliability of the expert's opinion, and the opinion is therefore precluded.
Figarola's January 2, 2023, report concluded that Plaintiff suffers from PTSD. His opinion is "based upon a reasonable degree of psychiatric certainty." Nowhere in the report did Figarola explain how or why he concluded that Plaintiff is suffering from PTSD. The facts are connected to the conclusion only by the ipse dixit of Figarola's "reasonable degree of psychiatric certainty." Unlike Lucas's July 2019 report, he does not analyze Plaintiff's symptoms under the DSM-V or any other recognized method of PTSD diagnosis.
The February reports are similarly conclusory. The February 6, 2023, report contains neither a conclusion nor reasoning. Figarola confirmed this in his deposition, stating it does not contain additional expert opinion. In his final report, on February 28, 2023, Figarola simply stated that Plaintiff's prognosis is poor and his condition is chronic and unlikely to improve for the remainder of his life. There is no explanation for how he arrived at this conclusion. For these reasons, the Court precluded Figarola's testimony on Plaintiff's PTSD.
Figarola's January and February 2023 reports did not satisfy Rule 702 because they are conclusory and do not detail any methodology.
B. Figarola is Not Qualified to Testify Regarding Forensic Psychology
Figarola is not qualified to testify regarding forensic psychology because he does not have the requisite experience or credentials in the field and lacks expertise with the tests administered to Plaintiff.
Figarola does not have experience or credentials in the field of forensic psychology. Although it is not necessary for an expert to possess academic credentials to testify, Figarola lacked the knowledge, skill, experience, or training in forensic psychology to otherwise qualify. Plaintiff argued that an expert with "extensive practical experience" can be qualified "despite the absence of academic forensic credentials."
But Figarola does not have extensive practical experience. His C.V. shows experience in the field of adult psychiatry, but no experience in forensic psychology. He admitted that he is not an expert in psychology or forensic psychology. For these reasons, the Court precluded the testimony of Figarola regarding forensic psychology.
III. Paul Gazaleh
Plaintiff proffered Paul Gazaleh as an economic loss expert to calculate Plaintiff's past and future lost earnings. Gazaleh produced an expert report that estimated the present value of Plaintiff's lost lifetime earnings to be between $2 million and $2.8 million.
This estimate assumes that Plaintiff would have graduated from college with a degree in computer science or biomedical engineering, obtained a job as a computer engineer or biomedical engineer, received fringe benefits, and is 100% disabled, unable to work for the rest of his life. The Government challenged each of these assumptions as speculative and unsupported by the record.
A. The assumption that Plaintiff will never work again is speculative
Gazaleh assumed that Plaintiff "will have no future earnings capacity" because he has not worked since his incarceration and Figarola's report stated that Plaintiff is "ill and disabled." Plaintiff concedes that the record established by Figarola shows that "Plaintiff is not 100% disabled," but argues that this is a discrepancy that goes to weight, not admissibility.
The assumption, however, is critical to a reliable opinion that represents an accurate present value of Plaintiff's lost earnings. Here, the record created by Plaintiff's own experts suggests that Plaintiff may one day work again. Gazaleh's assumption that Plaintiff is 100% disabled and unable to earn another dollar in his lifetime is speculative and renders the analysis unreliable.
B. The assumptions that Plaintiff would have earned a bachelor's degree and obtained employment are speculative
Gazaleh assumed that Plaintiff would have earned a degree in computer engineering or biomedical engineering and gained employment in one of those industries.
Plaintiff argued that any assumption that "he would have earned a degree and obtained employment as a computer engineer is reasonable given his educational trajectory." Plaintiff's educational history does not lead to the inference of graduation and future employment in computer or biomedical engineering. Years earlier, Plaintiff took classes at University of Cape Coast in Ghana and Devry College in Queens, New York, but did not earn a degree at either institution.
Beyond the mere fact that Plaintiff had started his studies again, Plaintiff does not provide factual support for the inference that he would graduate. Further, in his report, Gazaleh does not consider the graduation rates at New Jersey Institute of Technology ("NJIT"), Plaintiff's academic performance, or Plaintiff's age in reference to graduation and employment rates.
The report then compounds the speculation that Plaintiff would graduate with further speculation that he would obtain a job as a biomedical engineer or computer engineer. Plaintiff's ability to become a biomedical engineer is not a reasonable assumption, as he had abandoned that path when he started studying computer engineering at NJIT. This assumption creates a flaw that impugns the entire analysis, as Gazaleh uses the midpoint of salaries between a computer engineer and biomedical engineer to estimate Plaintiff's yearly earnings. Further, the assumption that Plaintiff would find employment as a computer engineer is based on the speculative assumption that Plaintiff would have graduated with a degree. The assumption is also undermined by Plaintiff's sporadic pre-incident employment, which does not suggest a future of thirty-plus years of steady employment.
C. Gazaleh's assumption that Plaintiff would receive fringe benefits is speculative and unsupported by Plaintiff's work history
Lastly, Gazaleh assumed that Plaintiff would receive retirement benefits after finding full-time employment. Plaintiff has never received fringe benefits from his former employer. The assumption that Plaintiff will receive fringe benefits at a job he has never worked, requiring a degree he does not possess, is too speculative for expert testimony under Rule 702.
Gazaleh's report is based on several speculative assumptions that are conditional upon each other. For these reasons, the Court precluded the testimony of Gazaleh.
Held
The Court granted Defendant United States's motion to preclude the testimony of Plaintiff's expert witnesses.
Key Takeaway
Expert reports must contain not only the conclusions of the expert, but also the bases and methodology for how the expert arrived at their opinion. An expert opinion requires some explanation as to how the expert came to his conclusion and what methodologies or evidence substantiate that conclusion. Neither Daubert nor the Rules of Evidence require a district court to admit an opinion "that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert."
Case Details:
Case Caption: | Nkansah V. United States |
|---|---|
Docket Number: | 1:18cv10230 |
Court Name: | United States District Court for the Southern District of New York |
Order Date: | November 04, 2026 |




