Human Factors Expert’s Opinions on Alternative Warnings Excluded
Posted on June 19, 2025 by Expert Witness Profiler
This case arises out of an alleged design defect and failure to warn regarding a 2017 Toyota Tacoma. Lee Griffin was the primary driver of a 2017 Toyota Tacoma. After Griffin died due to accidental carbon monoxide poisoning from an automobile inadvertently continuing to run in the garage, Caroline Griffin filed suit individually and as executor of Lee Griffin’s estate.
The Defendants filed a motion to exclude certain opinions offered by the Plaintiff’s proffered human factors and warnings expert, Joellen Gill.
Human Factors Engineering Expert Witness
Joellen Gill, CHFP, CXLT, CSP attended Georgia Tech and Wright State Universities for her undergraduate work, earning a BS in human factors engineering in 1979. Her nearly four-decade career includes 15 years in aerospace and national defense industries as a human factors engineer specializing in safety and risk management.
Gill started part time at ACS in 1994 after completing a master’s degree in engineering, accepted a full-time position in 2005, then, after obtaining certification as a Human Factors Professional, was lead engineer on her first case just a year later. She is also a licensed tribometrist and a Certified Safety Professional.
Discussion by the Court
Specifically, the Defendants sought to exclude “opinions regarding alternative warnings or that a different warning would have changed the decedent’s behavior at the time of the subject incident.”
During her deposition on August 8, 2024, Gill was asked, “In your opinion, what warnings should Toyota have provided for the 2017 Toyota Tacoma?” She responded, in part, “I am not a design engineer. I think it’s improper for me to offer opinions related to specific warnings that should have been provided in a vacuum.” She then explained that her “overarching opinion” was that Toyota adopted a safety strategy that relied on users taking action to protect themselves—something she believed was the least effective method of ensuring safety.
Later in the deposition, Gill was asked whether she had formed any opinions on whether a different set of warnings or alerts would have changed Lee Griffin’s behavior on the day of the incident. She answered, “I don’t have any specific opinions about other warnings that would have changed his behavior… with respect to leaving his vehicle running inadvertently.”
However, just twelve days after her deposition, Gill submitted a rebuttal report stating: “If Toyota had wished to give an effective external audible warning, Toyota could have designed the vehicle to blow its horn when left running without the key fob present in the vehicle.” She further asserted, “An effective audible alert would have resulted in Griffin recognizing he had not turned off his vehicle and therefore would have resulted in a change in his behavior.”
Plaintiff’s Arguments
The Plaintiff did not claim that these opinions had been disclosed in Gill’s initial report or deposition. Instead, she argued (1) that the statements were part of a timely rebuttal in response to the Defendants’ expert’s opinion regarding the vehicle’s “feedback,” and (2) that any resulting prejudice was due to Toyota scheduling Gill’s deposition before rebuttal reports were due.
Analysis
The Plaintiff offered no explanation for Gill’s failure to include these opinions in her initial expert report. Instead, she placed the blame on the Defendants for deposing Gill before the rebuttal reports were filed. However, this timing did not eliminate the prejudice caused by introducing new and improper opinions in a rebuttal report.
Even if the Defendants had received the rebuttal report beforehand and questioned Gill about its contents, the prejudice from her untimely opinions would have remained.
Moreover, even assuming for the sake of argument that the opinions were timely, Rule 26 required expert reports to explain not only what conclusions were reached, but also how and why the expert reached them. Gill failed to meet this standard. She offered no reasoning, analysis, or citation to support her claim that a vehicle horn alert would have been “effective” or that it “would have resulted in a change in [Lee Griffin’s] behavior.” As a result, the Court held that these opinions failed to comply with the disclosure requirements under Rule 26.
Held
The Court granted the Defendant’s motion to exclude certain opinions offered by the Plaintiff’s proffered human factors and warnings expert, Joellen Gill.
Key Takeaway:
Under Rule 26, a witness retained to provide expert testimony must prepare a written report that includes “a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them.”
If a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.
Case Details:
| Case Caption: | Griffin V. Toyota Motor Corporation Et Al |
| Docket Number: | 1:23cv3107 |
| Court Name: | United States District Court, Georgia Northern |
| Order Date: | June 18, 2025 |
