Law Enforcement Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Handcuffing

Plaintiff filed the instant suit against Defendants, bringing claims of excessive force, false arrest, and unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, together with accompanying state law claims.

Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that on July 13, 2024, Defendant Steven Helmich, a police officer employed by Defendant Village of South Jacksonville, arrested Plaintiff solely because he refused to produce identification when Defendant Helmich responded to a disturbance in the lobby of a hotel where Plaintiff was a guest.

Plaintiff Michael Keithley filed a Rule 702 motion to exclude the testimony of Defendants’ expert witness Mark S. Lamb.

Law Enforcement Expert Witness

Mark S. Lamb worked in various capacities for the Peoria Police Department, including regularly working as a patrol officer and regularly being involved in the training of new hires.

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Discussion by the Court

First, Plaintiff argued that Lamb identified no objective, reliable principles or methodology that he applied in this case. Second, Plaintiff maintained that Lamb improperly speculates on disputed facts and credibility issues, and without having reviewed all relevant materials. Third, Plaintiff argued that Lamb’s opinions are impermissible legal conclusions that tell the jury how to decide the case. Finally, Plaintiff asserted that Lamb is not qualified to offer medical or injury causation opinions.

Defendants disputed Plaintiff’s characterization of Lamb’s opinions as relying on speculative or disputed facts, not being grounded in reliable principles or methods, and constituting impermissible legal conclusions. However, Defendants conceded that Lamb is not qualified to render medical opinions and will not testify about the cause of any injuries in this case.

A. Expert Qualifications

The Court concluded—and Plaintiff did not argue otherwise— that Lamb’s 27 years of experience working for the Peoria Police Department, including regular work as a patrol officer, constitutes sufficient experience.

B. Reliability of Methodology

The Court held that Lamb’s report does not evince the use or application of a reliable methodology. Although Lamb prefaces his opinions with a one-paragraph description of his experience and qualifications, he does not explain how he applied that experience to the facts of this case or why his experience is a sufficient basis for his opinions, nor does he link his opinions to generally accepted standards in law enforcement or from his own experience in the field.

As one representative example, in Lamb’s report, he summarily opined that “upon arrival at the hotel, Helmich took appropriate steps to investigate the call that had been placed to Morgan County Dispatch by the hotel manager”—without setting out any relevant standards for what constitutes “appropriate steps” in responding to a dispatch call of that nature and then explaining any consistencies (or inconsistencies) between Defendant Helmich’s investigatory steps in this case and the general standards understood by Lamb based upon his own training and experience.

When Lamb does identify any specific basis for his opinion that particular actions by Defendant Helmich were “appropriate,” “reasonable,” or supported by “ample” reasons, he regularly bases those opinions solely on the materials he reviewed (typically citing only “the body camera video and audio”) without drawing any connection to his own qualifications, experience, training, or understanding of any relevant standards. At other times, Lamb opined that “Officer Helmich acted appropriately, and consistently with applicable laws and statutes” without identifying any applicable laws or statutes whatsoever.

Even when Lamb does refer to his own experience as the basis for an opinion—for example, “I do not believe, based upon my years of experience and training as a police officer, having taken hundreds of arrestees into custody, that Officer Helmich exercised or utilized any ‘excessive force’ upon Michael Keithley”—he does not elaborate on that training, experience, or the process of taking arrestees into custody in any manner that would assist the jury or that would constitute a reliable methodology.

Lamb’s opinions regarding the handcuffing of Plaintiff could, conceivably, incorporate specialized knowledge regarding “particular techniques or equipment used by police officers in the field” that would not be known to a juror.

However, while Lamb’s opinions on that topic do refer to law enforcement practices such as handcuffs being “double-locked” and an officer “placing his thumb between the handcuffs and the [arrestee’s] right wrist,” Lamb’s report did not actually explain or elaborate upon these practices in any manner that would inform a jury as to whether these are standard practices, what the basis for those practices is, and whether Defendant Helmich’s actions were consistent or inconsistent with any standard practices for handcuffing.

In reviewing Lamb’s expert report, and based upon the representative opinions discussed above, the Court cannot find that Lamb has employed “the same level of intellectual rigor” that is required of an expert; rather, Lamb’s approach to this case largely asked that the Court and the jury simply "take his word for it” without showing his work through a reliable methodology.

C. Relevance of Testimony

To begin with, Lamb’s report is replete with opinions as to ultimate legal conclusions: for example, that Defendant Helmich “acted in a reasonable fashion,” “acted appropriately, and consistently with applicable laws and statutes,” and “had more than ample or sufficient probable cause.” Defendants agreed that his proposed expert testimony will include the following “key opinions”: that Defendant Helmich’s investigation “was professional and reasonable,” his “questioning of Keithley was appropriate,” and he “used a reasonable amount of force.”

As Defendants correctly characterize this matter in their Response, “this is a relatively straightforward action,” involving “a bread and butter police investigation” and “basic concepts of police conduct.” In short, by the Defendants’ own characterization this is not a case involving “factual complexity”; rather, it is one of the “many cases in which evaluating an officer’s conduct will primarily draw on the jury’s collective common sense.”

As an example, the jury could easily use their common sense to conclude, as Lamb did in his report, that there was an “obvious reason to believe that Michael Keithley had caused a problem or disturbance at the hotel” because “both the manager and the front desk clerk had identified Keithley as someone who had caused a problem or disturbance in the hotel” and due to the “demeanor of the front desk clerk being visibly upset and crying.”

In sum, Lamb’s opinion would not be relevant where his testimony would principally be “regarding facts that people of common understanding can easily comprehend.”

Held

The Court granted Plaintiff Michael Keithley's Rule 702 motion to exclude the testimony of Defendants' expert witness Mark S. Lamb.

Key Takeaway

Lamb’s reference to his “years of experience and training,” without further elaboration, did not assist the jury by providing any type of specialized knowledge such as standard practices or a description of the typical law enforcement response to a specific situation. Therefore, Lamb’s report failed to make a connection between his qualifications (i.e., his experience in law enforcement) and how he arrived at his opinions in this case via a reliable methodology.

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