---
title: "Fire and Explosion Expert's Responsibility Opinion Excluded"
meta:
  "og:description": "The fire and explosion expert was precluded from opining on inapplicable fire codes that have not been adopted by Indiana"
  "og:title": "Fire and Explosion Expert's Responsibility Opinion Excluded"
  author: "Shuva Guha Thakurta"
  description: "The fire and explosion expert was precluded from opining on inapplicable fire codes that have not been adopted by Indiana"
---

# Fire and Explosion Expert's Responsibility Opinion Excluded

Posted on August 10, 2026 by Shuva Guha Thakurta

Plaintiffs Tushawn Craig and Marquetta Stokes (together, the "Plaintiffs") initiated this action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated (the "Class") against the City and Defendants Cornerstone Trading Group, LLC, and Seth Smith after a fire occurred at 308, 310, and 358 NW F Street, Richmond, Indiana (collectively, the "Properties") resulting in members of the Class being evacuated from their homes.

The Plaintiffs retained Dr. [William D. Hicks](https://expertwitnessprofiler.com/expert-witness/William-Hicks/1570078) as an expert to provide a life and safety code review for the Properties. The City filed a motion to exclude the testimony from Hicks, contending that the Report does not comply with [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B)](https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_26) and that Hicks' testimony in the report is inadmissible under [Federal Rule of Evidence 702](https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/rule_702#:~:text=Rule%20702%20sets%20forth%20the,is%20a%20relatively%20narrow%20inquiry.).

![Fire and Explosion Expert's Responsibility Opinion Excluded](https://media.jurimatic.com/images/blog_pic_640X480_2026_08_10T201143_155.webp)

## Fire and Explosion Expert Witness

Dr. [William D. Hicks](https://expertwitnessprofiler.com/expert-witness/William-Hicks/1570078) Ed.D., IAAI-CFI, CFPS, CFEI, CFII, CVFI, is a professor, fire and explosion analyst, and nationally recognized expert in fire protection and life-safety systems. Hicks holds a Doctor of Education in Educational Leadership, a Master of Science in Loss Prevention and Safety, and a Bachelor of Science in Fire and Safety Engineering Technology Fire and Explosion Investigation, all from Eastern Kentucky University. He is also a graduate of the National Fire Academy’s Executive Fire Officer Program.

[Want to know more about the challenges William Hicks has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report](https://expertwitnessprofiler.com/order/add?eId=1570078&amp;pId=3).

## **Discussion by the Court**

On January 24, 2025, Plaintiffs disclosed the report, which states that it is a fire and life safety code review. The Report is twelve pages long and purports to assert four main conclusions with which the City takes issue. First, Hicks sought to offer testimony at trial that the City's conduct, or lack thereof, constituted various fire code violations (the "Code Violation Opinion"). Second, he sought to offer testimony that the City, as title owner of the 310/358 Properties, was in control of the Properties from the time it became owner until the time of the fire in April 2023 (the "Control Opinion"). Third, Hicks sought to offer testimony at trial that the City was responsible for addressing hazards at the 310/358 Properties but failed to do so (the "Responsibility Opinion"). Fourth and finally, he sought to offer testimony that the City's failure to comply with fire code violations and remediate known fire hazards caused the exacerbation and scale of the resulting fire (the "Causation Opinion").

### **A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)**

The City challenged Hicks' report and argued that it does not comply with Rule 26(a)(2)(B). First, rather than a complete statement of all opinions that Hicks plans to offer at trial, the report only contains "a summary report of [his] review to date" and expressly states it is "not intended to list and describe each fact upon which the findings and conclusions are based." Second, the report contains a brief statement of qualifications but does not contain a list of cases in which Hicks has testified at trial or in a deposition during the past 4 years. Finally, the report did not provide the hourly rate that Hicks charged Plaintiffs, either for his study or trial testimony. The City also contended that even if Plaintiffs suggested that Hicks' deposition testimony could cure the significant deficiencies in his expert report, Rule 26(a)(2) does not allow parties to cure deficient expert reports by supplementing them with deposition testimony.

The Court found that Hicks' deposition testimony that his report contains all information that he relied upon, in combination with the Plaintiffs agreement that they will not introduce any new evidence not contained in Hicks' Report, supports that any violation is harmless under [Rule 37(c)(1)](https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_37).

Here, Hicks' deposition testimony did not contain any new information, and the opinions the City challenges concerning what led to the fire and the scale and scope of the fire were already contained in the disclosed report. Thus, the City did not suffer an unfair surprise. Moreover, Hicks' assertions about what led to the fire do not purport to establish the origin of the fire as the City claims. The report merely concludes—as do ample other documents including the Richmond Fire Department's inspections and the Uniform Building Code Orders—that the large collection of combustible materials exacerbated the fire. Hicks' report does not purport to conclude what precise combustion began the fire. Moreover, the City had Hicks' report prior to his deposition, and Hicks specifically stated that all information he relied upon is contained in his report, including his opinions concerning what led to the fire and the scale and magnitude of the fire. The Court found the City was neither prejudiced nor surprised by Hicks' opinions in his deposition and could have cured any prejudice.

### B. Fed. R. Evid. 702

#### **_1. Outdated Inspection_**

The City asserted that Hicks bases all his opinions solely on an inspection of the Properties conducted on May 15, 2019, almost 4 years before the fire occurred on April 11, 2023, and over two years prior to the City owning the 310/358 Properties. The City contended that because of this, there are no "fully documented fire code violations" during the City's ownership of the 310/358 Properties as Hicks claims.

The Plaintiffs contended that Hicks' report was not based solely on the 2019 Richmond Fire Department inspection reports but also upon the Unsafe Building Commission's findings, the City's own code enforcement records, and the governing fire safety codes, including the International Fire Code, the Indiana Administrative Code, and Indiana's Unsafe Building Law. Hicks also reviewed fire safety violations documented by the City's own fire prevention personnel and assessed those violations against the record evidence to perform an independent evaluation. From this analysis, Hicks considered whether the identified hazards were consistent with cited violations and opined on the consequences of the failure to mitigate those known fire safety risks in the aftermath of the April 2023 fire. Plaintiffs further contended that Hicks' Report clearly explains the sources and methodology relied upon. The Court agreed.

While the City reasserted its same argument in its reply brief—that Hicks only reviewed an inspection of the Properties conducted on May 15, 2019—the City simultaneously concedes that "there is no record of any inspection between the City's inspection in May 2019 and the fire in April 2023." Were the Court to agree with the City in its assertion that any expert testimony that is not based on a review of inspections of the Properties from 2020-2023—inspections the City concedes do not exist—should be considered unreliable, then no expert would be able to testify in this case, including those offered by the City. This cannot be a proper outcome.

The City's argument is also unpersuasive considering that neither the Plaintiffs nor Hicks had reason to know of the potential fire at the Properties. Requiring the Plaintiffs to obtain an independent inspection of a building prior to a fire they did not know would occur is not reasonable. The City cannot fail to inspect the Properties even though it was one of the few parties in a position to do so only to claim that the Plaintiffs' purported expert testimony is unreliable for lack of recent inspection.

#### **_2. The Scientific Method_**

The City asserted that Hicks relies on NFPA 921, Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations, as the methodology supporting his opinions. The City asserted that NFPA 921 is not intended for code analysis, and points to its own expert's opinion that NFPA 921 requires the use of the scientific method in performing an original and cause analysis of a fire loss. The City's expert opined that NFPA 921 does not contain a methodology for performing a code analysis and that the scientific method is ill-suited to the proper analysis of the applicable code requirements in a given jurisdiction. The City asserted that when it obtained title to the 310/358 Properties, it specified in the Sales Disclosure Document that the intended "occupancy/use" of the property was for "remediation/demolition."

Experts often disagree, and dueling expert opinions are not uncommon. Such disagreements are best suited for a jury to resolve and, should it be necessary, objections at trial rather than total exclusion.

#### _3. Personal Knowledge_

Next, the City contended that Hicks essentially took the 2019 inspection report and regurgitated it. The City pointed out that Hicks did not take any photographs or documentation or interview anyone regarding the 2019 inspection report. Rather, he simply accepted 2019 inspection report as accurate. The City argued that Hicks' analysis was based on an international model code, IFC 2012, not Indiana's applicable fire code, and courts have excluded expert testimony when the experts cite outdated versions of the code at issue. Thus, allowing Hicks to simply restate information already in the record and relying on an inapplicable code will not assist the trier of fact in assessing any alleged fire code violation at the Properties, contrary to the requirements of Rule 702(a), and is not based on any facts or data Hicks collected himself.

The Court agreed with the City that allowing Hicks to introduce testimony concerning inapplicable code sections that have not been adopted by Indiana would serve only to confuse the jury, especially considering a negligence claim remains in this case. There is a risk that the jury may determine that because Hicks asserted that the City violated an inapplicable code, it was negligent. Moreover, the Court agreed that simply citing to the entirety of the Indiana Administrative Code and Unsafe Building Law is insufficient.

#### **_4. Hicks' "Control Opinion_**_"_

The City next turns to Hicks' Control Opinion, where he states that "the City of Richmond, IN had held control and ownership of the 310/358 Properties for two years." The City contended that control is a legal question relating to whether the City had a duty to Plaintiffs, and that legal question is in the purview of the judge, and not an expert witness.

While the Court agreed that the issue of control is a legal one solely for the judge, the Court has already determined in its Order on Pending Summary Judgment Motions that the City owed a duty to the Plaintiffs irrespective of control because foreseeability was the relevant inquiry, not control. Accordingly, such objection is better suited for trial and can be made in context should the need arise.

#### _5. Hicks' "Responsibility Opinion"_

The Court need not discuss whether Hicks' responsibility opinion is a legal conclusion as the Court has already granted the City's motion to exclude this opinion.

#### _6. Hicks' "Causation Opinion"_

The City next turned to Hicks' causation opinion, which stated that the fire "and its subsequent impact on the community resulted from the City of Richmond and Cornerstone Trading Group, LLC's failure to mitigate multiple fire code violations identified and documented during the May 15, 2019 inspection."

The City pointed out that Hicks did not do any analysis to quantify the impact that the failure to correct the violations had on the fire, even though an analysis could have been done by reviewing an inventory for the Properties. However, Hicks testified that an analysis would not have been done by him, but rather by a Fire Protection Engineer. And Hicks did not conduct a failure analysis—that is, he did not evaluate how a change in conditions could have prevented or mitigated the fire—the very analysis required to support his conclusion.

The City is once again attempting to have the Court exclude Hicks' report and opinions on the grounds that he did not perform an analysis that he specifically testified would have had to have been performed before the fire. As the Court stated previously, neither Hicks nor the Plaintiffs knew that the fire was going to occur. Hicks was consistent and clear through his report and deposition that his opinion relates to failures to remediate known and documented fire code violations that led to the fire's intensity, size, and duration. The Court cannot say that his opinions are causation are unreliable and not admissible for any purpose.

## **Held**

The Court granted in part and denied in part the City's motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. William D. Hicks, Jr.

## **Key Takeaway**

The trial court must use the criteria relevant to a particular kind of expertise in a specific case to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.

## **Case Details:**

| Case Caption: | Craig V. Cornerstone Trading Group, LLC |
| --- | --- |
| Docket Number: | 1:23cv1575 |
| Court Name: | United States District Court, Indiana Southern |
| Order Date: | August 07, 2026 |

---

## **You Might Also Like**

![Fire and Explosion Expert&#39;s Responsibility Opinion Excluded](https://media.jurimatic.com/images/blog_pic_640X480_2026_08_10T201143_155.webp) [**Fire and Explosion Expert's Responsibility Opinion Excluded**](https://expertwitnessprofiler.com/fire-and-explosion-experts-responsibility-opinion-excluded/fire-and-explosion-experts-responsibility-opinion-excluded)![Transportation Safety Expert Allowed to Opine on Alleged Violations ](https://media.jurimatic.com/images/blog_pic_640X480_2026_08_10T164632_5791.webp) [**Transportation Safety Expert Allowed to Opine on Alleged Violations **](https://expertwitnessprofiler.com/fire-and-explosion-experts-responsibility-opinion-excluded/transportation-safety-expert-allowed-to-opine-on-alleged-violations-)![Accounting Expert Allowed to Opine on Monetary Damages](https://media.jurimatic.com/images/blog_pic_640X480_2026_08_07T173048_9091.webp) [**Accounting Expert Allowed to Opine on Monetary Damages**](https://expertwitnessprofiler.com/fire-and-explosion-experts-responsibility-opinion-excluded/accounting-expert-allowed-to-opine-on-monetary-damages)![Computer Science Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Infringement](https://media.jurimatic.com/images/blog_pic_640X480_2026_08_07T144644_2281.webp) [**Computer Science Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Infringement**](https://expertwitnessprofiler.com/fire-and-explosion-experts-responsibility-opinion-excluded/computer-science-expert-not-allowed-to-opine-on-infringement)![Transportation Expert Allowed to Opine on Contracts and Policies](https://media.jurimatic.com/images/blog_pic_640X480_2026_08_06T195710_261.webp) [**Transportation Expert Allowed to Opine on Contracts and Policies**](https://expertwitnessprofiler.com/fire-and-explosion-experts-responsibility-opinion-excluded/transportation-expert-allowed-to-opine-on-contracts-and-policies)