Logistics Expert’s Fraud-Related Opinions Excluded
Posted on January 16, 2026 by Expert Witness Profiler
This is a False Claims Act action arising from Defendants Fluor Corporation, Inc. and Fluor Intercontinental, Inc.’s (“Fluor”) performance of logistics and life-support services for the United States military in Afghanistan under the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program IV (“LOGCAP IV”) contract and Task Order 0005 (“TO5”). Relators alleged, among other things, that Fluor knowingly submitted false claims and false statements to the Government in connection with award fee determinations and property-management obligations, and that Fluor retaliated against certain employees who raised concerns regarding those practices.
In support of their claims, Relators designated Dr. Gary M. Gaukler as an expert witness. According to his report, Dr. Gaukler analyzed data extracted from Fluor’s Maximo property-management system and related materials to identify patterns reflected in recorded response times, repair times, and other system entries. Relators contended that this analysis will assist the jury in evaluating Fluor’s representations regarding its performance and internal controls.
Fluor filed a motion to exclude or limit discrete portions of Gaukler’s proposed testimony. Specifically, Fluor challenged opinions and characterizations that it contended exceeded Gaukler’s expertise, lacked a reliable methodological foundation, or impermissibly opined on contractual compliance, fraudulent intent, and the interpretation of documents and communications.
Logistics Expert Witness
Dr. Gary Michael Gaukler is a tenured Full Professor at the Drucker School of Management, Claremont Graduate University, located in Claremont, California. He was previously a Professor in the Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering at TexasA&M University. His academic work—both in research and teaching—centers on the application of analytics to logistics, supply chain management, and inventory management, including optimal inventory control policies, quality assurance and inspection strategies, and logistics. He regularly teaches courses in operations management, supply chain management, logistics, procurement, statistics, business analytics, and predictive analytics.
Discussion by the Court
A. Qualifications
Fluor did not meaningfully dispute that Gaukler is qualified to analyze large datasets, apply statistical and analytical techniques, and identify patterns within structured data such as Fluor’s Maximo system.
However, certain opinions offered by Gaukler venture into areas—such as government-contract compliance, fraud, and intent—for which he lacks relevant expertise. Gaukler’s training and experience are in data analytics and quantitative analysis, not in interpreting government contracts, assessing contractual compliance, or evaluating fraudulent intent. Accordingly, the Court held that any testimony that crosses into those subjects would exceed the scope of his qualifications.
B. Maximo Queries and Descriptive Analytics
Although Fluor stated that it did not challenge the admissibility of Gaukler’s underlying Maximo queries, data extraction, or descriptive statistics, its motion advances a narrower conception of permissible expert testimony—one under which Gaukler would be limited to presenting raw query outputs while being precluded from identifying or highlighting patterns, trends, or anomalies reflected in the data. In Fluor’s view, any step beyond tabulation risks impermissible inference or speculation.
It is the Court’s duty to distinguish between reliable expert assistance and testimony that risks misleading the jury.
Identifying what the data show reflects technical expertise in analytics, while offering explanations for why the data look as they do or what they ultimately signify in operational or legal terms may require additional subject-matter expertise or rest on assumptions not grounded in a reliable methodology.
As a result, the Court decided that Gaukler may testify regarding his Maximo queries, data extraction, descriptive statistics, and the identification of objectively observable patterns reflected in the data- but he may not offer explanations for the causes or implications of those patterns beyond what can be reliably inferred from his analytical methods.
C. Use of “Compliance” Terminology
Fluor challenged Gaukler’s repeated use of terms such as “compliance” or “non-compliance,” arguing that such language constitutes an impermissible contractual or legal conclusion.
The Court held that characterizing Fluor’s performance as “contractually compliant” or “non-compliant” risks conveying an authoritative conclusion about contractual obligations—particularly in the context of a government contract and False Claims Act claims—where the determination of compliance turns on contract interpretation and legal standards beyond Gaukler’s expertise.
At the same time, the underlying data and analytical results can be presented without using legally freighted labels. Doing so preserves the testimony’s probative value while avoiding the risk of misleading the jury.
Therefore, Gaukler may describe what the Maximo data reflect in factual and analytical terms, including measured response times and recorded intervals—but he may not characterize those results as establishing contractual compliance or non-compliance.
D. Speculative Inferences and Fraud-Related Opinions
Fluor next sought to exclude opinions that went beyond describing data patterns and instead speculate about why those patterns exist, particularly where such explanations imply misconduct or fraud. Fluor pointed to deposition testimony in which Gaukler disclaims expertise in fraud investigation, operational feasibility, and the real-world execution of logistics operations.
Gaukler is qualified to identify patterns reflected in the Maximo data. But where he offered explanations that imply fraud or misconduct, he simultaneously disclaims the expertise necessary to assess whether those explanations are feasible or supported by operational realities. In those circumstances, the proffered opinions rest not on reliable methodology, but on speculation. Allowing such testimony would risk presenting conjecture under the imprimatur of expertise and would not assist the jury within the meaning of Rule 702(a).
The Court decided that Gaukler may testify to inferences that are analytically supported by his data analysis, but he may not offer speculative explanations, insinuations of fraud or misconduct, or opinions regarding intent or wrongdoing.
E. Document and Email Narration
Fluor challenged portions of Gaukler’s proposed testimony in which he summarized or interpreted documents, emails, or communications, contending that such testimony amounts to narrative advocacy and places an expert gloss on materials the jury can read and evaluate for itself.
Fluor’s objection is directed not at Gaukler’s reliance on such materials as inputs to his analysis, but at testimony—reflected in his report and deposition—in which he recounts or interprets those materials without applying specialized expertise.
Rule 703 permits experts to base opinions on facts or data that may themselves be inadmissible if experts in the field would reasonably rely on them. It does not authorize an expert to disclose, narrate, or interpret those materials to the jury where doing so does not depend on specialized knowledge and merely places the expert’s subjective gloss on evidence the jury is equally capable of evaluating.
Nor may an expert serve as a conduit for hearsay or advocacy; the probative value of expert testimony must derive from the application of specialized expertise, not from summarizing or characterizing documents or communications.
Accordingly, while Gaukler may identify categories of materials he reviewed and explain how those materials informed his methodological decisions, he may not narrate, interpret, or opine on the meaning of documents or communications where such testimony does not depend on specialized expertise and would not assist the jury within the meaning of Rule 702(a).
The Court decided that Gaukler may identify the types of materials he reviewed and explain their relevance to his analytical methodology- but he may not narrate, interpret, or opine on the meaning of documents or communications where such interpretation does not require specialized expertise.
F. Summary of Rulings
In sum, the Court held that Gaukler’s testimony is admissible to the extent it is confined to data analytics and methodologically grounded inferences, and excluded to the extent it ventures into contractual conclusions, fraud-related speculation, or narrative interpretation of documents.
Held
The Court granted in part and denied in part the Defendants Fluor Corporation, Inc. and Fluor Intercontinental, Inc.’s motion to exclude certain opinions of Relators’ expert, Dr. Gary Gaukler.
Key Takeaway
Expert testimony explaining how data were selected, queried, summarized, and analyzed—and identifying objectively observable patterns reflected in those data—rests on specialized knowledge and reliable analytical methods. Such testimony assists the jury in understanding large and complex datasets generated by Fluor’s own systems and satisfies Rule 702(a)’s helpfulness requirement.
At the same time, Rule 702 draws a clear distinction between identifying what the data show and offering explanations for why the data look as they do or what they ultimately signify in operational or legal terms. The former reflects technical expertise in analytics; the latter may require additional subject-matter expertise or rest on assumptions not grounded in a reliable methodology.
Case Details:
| Case Caption: | United States ex rel. Charles R. Shepherd & Danny V. Rude |
| Docket Number: | 6:13cv2428 |
| Court Name: | United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, Greenville Division |
| Order Date: | January 14, 2026 |
